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POINT OF VIEW
BY JAMES A. GARDNER
JAMES A. GARDNER (jgard@buffalo.edu) is the
Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L. Aswad Professor
of Civil Justice, State University of New York,
University at Buffalo Law School. He earned
his undergraduate degree from Yale, and a law
degree from the University of Chicago.

New York’s Judicial Selection Process Is Fine –
It’s the Party System That Needs Fixing

A

fter a long period of mounting public dissatisfaction
with New York’s distinctively
undemocratic system of judicial elections, the federal courts have finally
forced the issue onto the state legislative agenda by striking down the
current system on federal constitutional grounds. Reform proposals
abound, most of which would make
the system either more democratic,
by opening up candidate access to
the primary ballot, or less democratic,
by substituting a system of executive
appointment. None of these proposals,
however, is likely to produce much
of an improvement because none of
them addresses the real problem. New
York’s method for choosing judges
is basically sensible and structurally
sound. The dysfunction lies, rather,
in New York’s party system, which
is utterly moribund. Until the state
develops a well-functioning system of
competitive and publicly accountable
political parties, no reform to the judicial selection process can be expected
to produce meaningful change.
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The Real Problem
New Yorkers have long been dissatisfied
with their system for electing judges,
which has existed in its current form
since 1921. In 1977, this dissatisfaction
resulted in a constitutional amendment
that removed the Court of Appeals from
the electoral system and substituted a
system of gubernatorial appointment.1
Lower court judgeships, however,
remain elective offices. Although public dissatisfaction with judicial elections
has not routinely prompted widespread
movements for reform, it has manifested
itself in more subtle ways, such as ballot
rolloff and a general loss of confidence
in the quality of state trial judges and the
quality of justice. By 2003, Chief Judge
Judith Kaye thought the problem serious enough to appoint a Commission to
Promote Public Confidence in Judicial
Elections (the “Feerick Commission”),
which studied the problem and produced a set of recommendations for
reform.2
While the Feerick Commission’s
proposals were circulating, the federal
District Court in Brooklyn dramatically

altered the landscape with its decision in López Torres v. New York State
Board of Elections,3 which invalidated
on federal constitutional grounds New
York’s method of electing trial judges.
In affirming the District Court’s decision, the Second Circuit ruled that the
structure of the state’s system of judicial
nominating conventions violates associational rights of party members that
are protected by the First Amendment.4
Specifically, the court held that “the
First Amendment affords candidates
and voters a realistic opportunity to
participate in the nominating process,”5
an opportunity that the current system
of judicial selection unconstitutionally
fails to provide. In view of these rulings, the state now faces an urgent
need to replace the invalidated system.
If it does not, the District Court has said
that it will impose a system of open primaries for elective judicial offices.
While this outpouring of concern
over New York’s dysfunctional judicial
selection process is understandable, I
shall argue here that it is misplaced.
Although the judicial selection system
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is broken, to be sure, its malfunction
is only a symptom of a much more
deeply rooted problem: the dysfunction of New York’s political parties
and, in consequence, the state’s system
of party democracy itself. Until these
problems are addressed, no reform to
the judicial selection process is likely
to produce a significant improvement.
In fact, there is nothing wrong with
the structure of New York’s judicial
selection institutions, which, at least on
paper, are capable of working perfectly
well; indeed, the underlying design
premises of the present system are
sound and sensible.
The problem, rather, is with the
behavior of actors within the institution. Evidently the party officials who
in practice run the judicial selection
process have entirely the wrong incentives; they, and the parties for whom
they act, lack the slightest degree of
accountability for undesirable behavior. A well-functioning party system
can serve as a powerful tool of democratic accountability. In New York, this
system has failed miserably. What we
ought to have is a system in which
parties compete to satisfy an obvious
public demand for meaningful choice
among the best possible candidates for
judicial office. What we have instead is
a system in which the parties collude
for their private advantage, and in
which they treat judgeships as a species
of patronage that is theirs to dispense,
on terms satisfactory to them alone.
Instead of being the beneficiary of
party competition, the people of New
York have been shut out of the deal.

A Fair System, at Least on Paper
In its fundamental structure, New
York’s system for electing supreme
court justices can be best understood
as an entirely reasonable response to
the very real difficulties that inhere
in any attempt to design a method
for selecting judges in a democracy.
Because of the peculiar combination of
independence and accountability that
judges in a democracy must possess,
there is no way to select judges that
does not face potentially serious flaws.

The two principal methods for selecting judges – appointment and election
– sit at opposite ends of a spectrum
ranging from the least to the most
democratic. Yet too much democracy
can be as disruptive to the success of a
judicial selection system as too little.
When approached in the right spirit, a system of judicial appointment,
in which the governor or other chief
executive does the appointing, can
without a doubt produce outstanding
judges. The main potential problem
with appointment, however, is its susceptibility to abuse by the appointing official. Abuse of the appointing
power most commonly takes the form
of patronage appointments, in which
judges are elevated to office on the
basis of their personal loyalty to the
governor, or as a reward for having
performed some kind of service to the
governor or the governor’s party – a
condition of appointment.
Until 1845, New York, like all
states admitted in the nation’s first 40
years, utilized a system of gubernatorial appointment of judges. In 1846,
however, the state switched to electing its judges, for two reasons. First,
a Jacksonian impulse toward greater
democracy swept the nation during
this period, a trend from which New
York was not immune. This impulse
was driven by an assumption – not
always well explored – that all or nearly all public officials, including judges,
should be popularly elected. In New
York, however, the switch to an elective judiciary also responded to a widespread belief that the state’s governors
had been distributing judgeships as a
kind of patronage.6 In New York, then,
the election of judges rests historically
on the belief that elected judges will
be more independent, fairer, and more
impartial than appointed judges.
The election of judges is by no
means, however, a panacea. Electing
judges, to be sure, addresses the problem of gubernatorial patronage to
some degree, but does so by switching the object of judges’ dependence
from the governor to the public. In
a democracy, of course, the depen-

dence of officials on public approval
is normally thought to be desirable,
but when the officials in question are
judges, the practice raises at least three
well-known potential problems. First,
it is possible, and perhaps likely, that
the public will be unable meaningfully
to evaluate the qualifications of judicial candidates and the performance
of sitting incumbents. Second, an elective judiciary raises the possibility that
judges will pander to public opinion
in their decisions rather than impartially applying the law. This is especially a concern after the U.S. Supreme
Court’s highly unfortunate decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,7
which held that many commonplace
state ethics rules restricting the scope
of judicial campaigning violate the
First Amendment. Third, requiring
judges to run for election requires
them to raise the necessary funds, and
the need to raise money opens judicial candidates to a different kind of
corruption: the excessive influence of
monied special interests.

Most states
select their judges
using some kind
of hybrid system.
Because both appointment and
election raise such potentially serious
problems, most states select their judges using some kind of hybrid system
that is deliberately structured to avoid
each of the extremes. The most common method by far is the so-called
“Missouri Plan,” in which judges are
appointed initially by the governor,
often from a list of candidates recommended by a bipartisan or nonpartisan
screening commission, and then stand
periodically for democratic review in
uncontested, nonpartisan retention
elections.8 New York’s present system, adopted in 1921, was designed
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in the same spirit. It offers, on paper,
a perfectly sensible and plausible way
to combine the advantages of appointment and election, while avoiding the
worst of their respective risks.
New York’s system of electing
supreme court judges proceeds in
three stages. The first consists of a
primary election, not of judicial candidates, but of delegates.9 These delegates are selected by each party’s
rank-and-file membership for the sole
purpose of attending a judicial nominating convention. Because delegates
exercise no function other than the
selection of the party’s judicial candidates, the system clearly contemplates

The New York system, however,
is more democratic than the Electoral
College in that it provides for a third
and final stage in which the selection of judges is referred back to the
people for a final decision. Delegates
to the judicial nominating conventions do not select judges, but instead
merely designate nominees to run as
candidates of their respective parties.
The ultimate choice among what the
system contemplates will be highly
qualified, competing candidates for
judicial office is reserved for the people
through direct popular election.11
As a matter of design, this system
provides an admirably balanced mix of

On paper, New York’s method for
selecting supreme court judges ought
to work as well as any other.
that delegates will be elected by party
members on the basis of their ability
to evaluate the qualifications of potential judicial candidates. In the second
stage, the elected delegates convene
at their respective judicial nomination conventions to select their party’s
judicial candidates.10 Under the circumstances, it seems clear that the system contemplates that the delegates,
selected for their expertise in things
judicial, will nominate only the very
best candidates that their parties are
capable of inducing to run. Up to this
point, incidentally, the system bears
a distinct resemblance to the federal
Electoral College, which was designed
to deal with what was thought at the
time to be an analogous problem: the
incompetence of the people to select
a president. The Framers’ solution,
echoed in the 1921 New York judicial convention plan, was that where
the people are deemed incompetent
to perform some necessary function of
democratic oversight, their role should
be limited to the election of competent intermediaries who will make the
actual decisions.
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popular participation and professional
expertise. By including the people at
both the beginning and the end of
the process, it seems well calculated to
secure all the benefits of popular participation in judicial elections as a guard
against official patronage. At the same
time, by leaving the actual identification of judicial candidates to individuals who are selected precisely for that
purpose, the system secures the benefits
of quality and competence associated
with appointment by informed and
well-qualified experts, while avoiding
the pitfalls of public incompetence in
the identification and evaluation of the
qualifications of good potential judges.
On paper, then, New York’s method for
selecting supreme court judges ought to
work as well as any other.

A Failed Party System
The problem today, of course, is that the
state’s judicial selection system simply
isn’t working as intended. The public
continues to do what is asked of it. The
parties, however, are not by any means
performing the role assigned to them
under the law. Indeed, the parties have

perverted the operation of the system
to the extent that it is barely recognizable as democratic. Although official
patronage has successfully been marginalized, the public in fact plays no
meaningful role. Contrary to its design
assumptions, New York’s system has
been deformed into one that dispenses
patronage, but the patronage is handed out by the political parties rather
than by the governor. The result is a
judicial selection process dominated
by party officials that is every bit as
corrupt as the pathologies of appointment and election that it was so carefully designed to avoid.
How exactly is this happening?
What are the parties doing to thwart
the proper operation of the system?
Here are just four of the most egregious offenses:12
1. The parties are extorting benefits,
such as donations of money and
services, from judicial candidates,
including from sitting judges who
seek reelection or election to a
higher court.
2. The parties are attempting to
influence the behavior of sitting
judges by creating an informal,
and extralegal, form of judicial
promotion in which candidates
must pay their dues in lower
or specialized courts before the
party will consider nominating
them for supreme court.
3. The parties are not seeking out,
and indeed are driving away,
many highly qualified candidates,
who are unwilling either to be
extorted or to put in long service
in a specialized lower court in
which they have no interest, and
then to have that service subjected to review not by voters, but by
party officials.
4. Worst of all, the parties are colluding to thwart the possibility of
meaningful popular choice, and
to maintain their own power over
judicial selection, by cutting deals
about whom to run, when, and
where, including cross-endorsement deals within judicial districts and even non-opposition
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and cross-endorsement deals that
cross district boundaries.
In short, the parties are not competing, as they should, for the approval
and votes of the electorate. Given the
crucial role assigned to the parties
by the state judicial selection system,
the system cannot possibly function
properly if the parties fail to play
their assigned role. Why don’t they
do so? The short answer is that New
York’s party system has become so
completely dysfunctional that it no
longer serves any positive role in the
democratic process.13

No Meaningful Party Democracy
Although the reasons behind the collapse of New York’s system of political parties are complex, I believe it is
possible nonetheless to trace much
of the present dysfunction to one,
and possibly two, underlying issues:
(1) the bipartisan gerrymander of the
state Legislature, and (2) the threemen-in-a-room problem.
Political scientists have long argued
that political parties are essential to any
kind of meaningful popular control
over government. The theory of party
democracy, often called the responsible party model, goes something like
this:14 In a mass democracy, the people
cannot and do not participate actively
in the formulation of policy, and thus
do not exercise any form of direct control over government policy. Instead,
the people exercise a form of indirect
control in that, if a majority of the populace feels that its wants are not being
satisfied, it can replace the set of rulers
in power with an alternate set; it can,
that is, “vote the bums out.” According
to political scientists, this form of indirect popular control requires political
parties because only parties can provide the coherent, unified sets of rulers
who will assume collective responsibility to the people for the manner in
which government power is used. For
this system to work, each party must
promote a coherent program of policies designed to satisfy the people’s
wishes. The party that wins a majority
of the offices of government in the elec-

tion then takes over the entire power of
the government and the entire responsibility for what the government does,
and uses its power to put its program
into effect. If it does a good job, the
voters will keep it in power. If it does
not, the voters will turn it out and designate a competing party to run things
more to their liking.
In New York, any possibility of
meaningful party democracy has been
utterly thwarted by the parties’ collusive legislative gerrymander, an
arrangement that has for 30 years allocated firm control of the state Assembly
to Democrats and of the state Senate to
Republicans15 – an impressive achievement in a state in which registered
Democrats outnumber registered
Republicans by approximately five
to three.16 This gerrymander fatally
undermines the operation of the state’s
system of party democracy because it

thoroughly thwarts the ability of the
electorate to hold any party accountable for the actions of the government.
Because of the gerrymander, not only
can neither party be voted out of the
chamber it controls, but no single party
can ever control the entire government.
Since neither party can be disciplined
by the voters, neither party has any
incentive to be responsive to the voters’
wishes – exactly the kind of incentive
that a well-functioning party system is
supposed to provide. Under these circumstances, the parties are entirely free
to run the judicial selection process (as
well as any other aspect of state governance) however they want without fear
of retribution from the voters. If they
choose to run the system collusively
rather than competitively, the voters
are virtually powerless to stop them.
In New York, the problems flowing
from the collusive gerrymander of the
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state Legislature are compounded by
another charming local custom: government by three men in a room. In
this system, the messy complexity of
an actual representative legislature is
stripped down to a simple system in
which essentially all significant legislative power is delegated by the Assembly
to the speaker and by the Senate to the
majority leader. These two legislators
then negotiate the legislative agenda of
the state directly and personally with
the governor, behind closed doors. This
practice further destroys the accountability of the political parties not only
because of its opacity, but because it
delegates and concentrates legislative
power in the hands of individuals who
are beyond the reach of public retribution. In this system, all significant legislative policy decisions are made by the
two legislative leaders, yet only a tiny
fraction of the electorate has any power
to hold the leaders electorally accountable. The leaders consequently lack
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any incentive at all to be responsive to
the wishes of the vast majority of New
York voters, and the only voters they
need to worry about are voters in their
own safely gerrymandered districts, so
they need not really worry about their
own constituents either. Such a system
has more in common with a hereditary
aristocracy than a democracy.

Break Up the Bipartisan
Gerrymander
Proposals for reforming New York’s
judicial selection process fall generally into one of two opposing camps:
those that would make the process
less democratic by creating a system
of gubernatorial and mayoral appointment; and those that would make the
process more democratic by instituting
a more open form of primary elections. Neither type of proposal is likely
to make much of a difference in the
operation of the selection process, or in
the ability of the parties to subvert that

process for their own benefit, until the
defects in the party system outlined
above have been addressed.
Let’s start with appointment.
Virtually all proposals to replace the
current elective system with an appointive one attempt to avoid the problem of
gubernatorial patronage by making use
of a bipartisan screening commission.17
Under such proposals, the governor
may appoint only candidates who have
been cleared by the commission, which
will in theory forward to the governor
the names only of the most qualified
candidates to be found in the state.
Until the party system is fixed, however, this is a false hope.
The theory of bipartisan candidate
screening proceeds on the premise
that political parties with opposing
interests will be able to find common
ground only by settling on candidates
who are uncontroversially of the highest quality. However, as their current
behavior indicates, if the parties are
not publicly accountable, they are both
willing and able to reach agreement on
other grounds besides candidate quality, and one such ground has been, and
is likely to continue to be, the parties’
mutual, private advantage.
In assessing the likelihood that an
independent judicial screening commission will produce better-quality
judges than the highly politicized system now in place, it is also instructive
to look at a similar area, facing similar
problems: redistricting. Numerous of
the reform proposals are based on
the proposition that gerrymandering
will stop, and genuinely competitive
elections will be possible, only if the
redistricting function is taken from the
Legislature and given to an independent redistricting commission, usually
of bipartisan composition.18 Yet recent
studies of the work of independent
redistricting commissions already in
operation have consistently found no
good evidence that these commissions
produce districting plans that are more
competitive, or state legislatures that
are more responsive, than when redistricting is performed by the legislature
itself.19 There is no reason to suppose a
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different result for independent, bipartisan judicial screening commissions.
Then there is the elephant in the
room that nobody really wants to
acknowledge: For 30 years New York
has used just such a judicial nominating commission to screen candidates
for gubernatorial appointment to the
Court of Appeals. Has this system produced the best possible high court? Has
the commission successfully purged
partisanship and patronage entirely from the appointment equation?
Seemingly not. Although the nominating commission method seemed to
work relatively well for a while, it
has not lived up to its potential in
some time. I don’t mean to suggest by
any means that recent appointments
to the Court of Appeals have been of
poor quality, but in a state with what
is surely the greatest accumulation of
legal talent in the nation, perhaps in
the world, the appointment process
cannot honestly be said to have elevated, or even to have considered, the
very best of the best. There is no reason
to suppose a screening commission
would produce any better results if its
charge were extended to lower court
judges; indeed, the federal experience
suggests that considerations other than
quality tend to become much more
important as one descends the judicial
hierarchy, and that is true even in the
presence of a reasonably well-functioning and accountable party system on
the national level.
The other family of reform proposals
making the rounds – and the one that
will be imposed by the U.S. District
Court should the Legislature fail to act
– would move in the opposite direction
by further democratizing the judicial
selection process through a system of
open primaries. Such primaries would
create alternative routes to nomination
for elective judgeships by permitting
voters to consider not only the “official” candidates backed by state and
local party leaders, but also “unofficial” candidates who, though not
supported by party leaders, command
significant support among the party
rank and file. The motivation behind

NYSBA on Selecting Judges
The New York State Bar Association has supported a merit system
of judicial selection since 1973. In 1993 the Association’s House of
Delegates approved “A Model Plan for Implementing the New York
State Bar Association’s Principles for Selecting Judges” (the “Model
Plan”) that would amend the New York State Constitution to replace
the current selection process with a merit selection system. Key components of the Model Plan include the following:
• The proposal would cover the Supreme Court, including the
Appellate Division; County, Family and Surrogate’s Courts; the Court of
Claims; the Civil and Criminal Court of the City of New York; full-time
city courts outside New York City; and the District Courts.
• Nonpartisan nominating commissions would propose three “highly qualified” candidates for each judicial vacancy.
• A statewide nominating commission would propose candidates
for appointment by the Governor to the Court of Claims.
• Four department-wide nominating commissions would propose candidates for appointment by the Governor to the Appellate
Division.
• A New York City nominating commission would propose candidates for appointment by the Mayor to trial courts in New York City.
• Judicial district nominating commissions would propose candidates for appointment to Supreme, County, Surrogate’s, Family and
District Courts outside New York City, with appointment being made
by the Governor in the case of Supreme Court and the chief elected
official of the county in the case of the other courts.
The Model Plan has served as a key resource in the development of
current legislation to implement a merit-selection system and efforts
by the Association to reform the current process for selection of New
York’s judges.

such a reform seems to be to break the
leadership’s stranglehold over nominations and allow independent, insurgent
candidates to crack open the system.
Until New York acquires a meaningful system of party competition, however, this too is unlikely to produce any
great improvement. As an initial matter, the open primary proposals have
all the flaws associated with excessive
popular involvement in judicial selection. First, the public has little basis
on which to evaluate the candidates.
Second, judicial campaigns tend to be
of low salience for the majority of voters and turnout is far lower in judicial
races than in races further up the ballot.20 Low turnout is even more of a
problem in primaries, the only phase
of the process that these reforms would
affect, and those who do turn out tend

disproportionately to be party activists
and loyalists,21 who would likely support the inside party candidate in any
case. As a result, the parties are likely
to be just as dominant under an open
primary system as under the current
system.
Furthermore, even in a more open
system of primary selection, candidates
supported by the formal party organization will still have a huge advantage
over independent party candidates
because they and only they will have
access to party campaign resources
and expertise. At most, all an open
primary is likely to do is to allow party
outsiders who are rich enough to selffinance their own campaigns to bring
themselves to the attention of the party
leadership. Interparty cross-nomination and noncompete deals will still
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allow parties to marshal the resources
to crush outsider campaigns, and as a
result the parties will still have ample
means to co-opt serious independents.
What is needed is a system that gives
parties an incentive to choose the very
best candidates, and to offer them competitively to the public. An open primary system does not do that, and the
parties will lack such an incentive until
the public is able to hold them accountable for their behavior.
Such accountability will not be
possible until, at a minimum, the
bipartisan gerrymander of the state
Legislature is broken up. Only when
political parties are forced actually to
compete with one another for control
of the Legislature can voters influence
the content of governmental policy.
Only when the voters have the ability
to dislodge one party from legislative
power and install its competitor will
they have the ability to hold parties accountable for their behavior,
thereby providing the parties with
meaningful incentives to alter their
behavior to conform to public wishes. Obviously, the Legislature will
not undertake this task by itself. The
electorate could do it, of course, but
the parties seem to have a knack
for mutual self-preservation that
leads them to mollify the public – or
enough of the public to avert a threat
– just before the point that it gets
angry enough to do something. That
leaves the courts in the best position
to address the problems posed by the
offending gerrymander.
The Second Circuit’s decision in
López Torres is troubling in many
respects, but its most troubling feature
by far is that the court simply misanalyzed the problem. The reason New
York’s system of judicial selection is
dysfunctional has little to do with
its underlying legal structure, which
the court precipitously invalidated.
It has instead everything to do with
the dysfunction of New York’s party
system. As a rule, I am disturbed when
a federal court steps in to dictate to a
state how it has to structure its internal
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political system,22 and I would much
rather see this matter handled by state
courts as a matter of state constitutional law, which furnishes many potentially promising grounds on which
to restrain abuse of the redistricting
process. If federal courts are going to
intervene, however, I would rather see
such intervention where it would do
some good – to break up the state’s
collusive, bipartisan legislative gerrymander – than to invalidate a specific
and perfectly reasonable choice made
by New Yorkers about how to set up
a particular aspect of their democratic
■
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